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Abstract
This paper considers the market for digital music. We claim that the
combination of the MP3 format and peer-to-peer networks has made
music non-excludable and this feature is essential for the understand-
ing of the economics of the music market. We study optimal business
models for selling non-excludable goods and show that despite promis-
ing theoretical results, adding just a slight uncertainty about the num-
ber of customers has significant negative implications for profitability.
Indeed, as the average number of customers tends to infinity the av-
erage payment per customer converges to zero. Therefore, the music
industry should concentrate on alternative ways of creating profit such
as selling access to listeners, concerts, merchandise, ringtones etc.
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1 Introduction
One of the major new features of the digital economy is the introduction of
information goods in digitalized form like digital music and movies, e-books
etc. It has long been known that information goods exhibit special features
compared to standard commodities. For instance they are experienced goods
in the sense that the value of the good only can be assessed while or after be-
ing used. Clearly this feature has an impact on the suitable business model
as witnessed by the availability of free samples for music, trial versions of
computer games, trailers for movies etc. On top of this, another signifi-
cant feature has appeared recently: due to digitalization and distribution via
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, information goods are nowadays (to a vary-
ing degree) characterized by non-excludability making them public goods in
eﬀect.
The digitalization of music has had a profound impact on the music indus-
try as witnessed by the many conflicts between the music industry, artists and
consumers as well as the changes in business models: some artists like ‘Arctic
Monkeys’ have launched themselves using Myspace letting people have free
access to downloads; some artists like ‘Madonna’ sign with concert-promoters
rather than record companies; the structure of the market is changing from
CD sales in physical stores to Web-based music stores like iTunes Store (sell-
ing more than 3 billion downloads since it was launched in 2003); consumers
have witnessed a significant decline in music prices (CD’s were sold for ap-
prox. 20 dollars some years ago and now an entire album can be bought
on iTunes for 10 dollars and on MPSparks for 2 dollars) etc. These eﬀects
and many more have been documented in various papers, e.g. Pfahl [16],
DeFigueiredo [7], Peitz & Waelbroeck [13], Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf [12],
Bhattacharjee et al. [2] and Hong & Kim [9].
We focus on business models for private suppliers selling public goods to
individual customers, who are free to choose whether to buy or not, discard-
ing centralized public financing using for instance Clark-taxes. According
to economic folklore the revenue from selling public goods to customers is
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limited because of free-riding. However, economic theory suggests that using
more complicated selling mechanisms non-excludability does not limit rev-
enues, in fact it is possible to first-order price discriminate - see Bagnoli &
Lipman [1] and Cremer & McLean [6]. A basic assumption in these models
is that the number of customers is known by the suppliers, but for the music
market where the number of copies sold can be extremely large this assump-
tion is questionable. Therefore, we make a minor modification introducing
uncertainty about the number of customers and show that then the revenue
obtained by any mechanism is very limited.
To be more specific we use a framework with a monopolist selling a non-
excludable good to customers where the monopolist may use other business
models than selling individual units of the good. We consider diﬀerent sce-
narios with respect to information of the customers and the monopolist. In
general every customer is assumed to know her own willingness to pay. How-
ever, taking into account that music is an experience good, the willingness
to pay should be reinterpreted as expected willingness to pay, where the ex-
pectations may be influenced by free samples, reviews, earlier work by the
artist, recommendations from friends etc. In our analysis the knowledge of
the monopolist (and the customers) about the willingness to pay of (other)
customers ranges from complete information, where the willingness to pay
of every customer is known by everybody, to incomplete information, where
only the probability distribution on willingness to pay is known.
As a main result we find that adding even a small uncertainty about
the number of customers has dramatic implications. Indeed, we show that
the average profit per customer converges to zero for a monopolist selling
individual units to customers indicating a rather limited potential for the
traditional business model of the music industry. Therefore, we conclude
that the profits of the music industry from selling individual copies of music
files or CD’s will continue to decline. Hence, the music industry seems to
be left with two options. An ‘open source’ strategy where music files are
distributed freely or at a very low price and intellectual property rights are
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waived. This strategy should create maximum attention for artists, who in
turn may sell concert tickets, ringtones and other sorts of merchandise. An
‘eyeball’ strategy where the music industry and artists sell access to listeners
and fans to third party businesses.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide a further dis-
cussion of the economic features of the music market. In Section 3 we study
the optimal selling mechanism using an aggregate price under various in-
formational assumptions. In Section 4 we then study an optimal Bayesian
mechanism using individual payments and demonstrate that a small uncer-
tainty about the number of customers has dramatic negative consequences
with respect to profitability. Finally, Section 5 contains our concluding dis-
cussion about the future structure of the music market.
2 Economic features of digital music
Two recent events have drastically changed the music industry: The first
event was the invention of the MP3 format by a group of German engineers.
In 1995 the MP3 format became the oﬃcial format for digitalized audio.
The second event took place in 1999 when the filesharing service Napster
was launched. In eﬀect, the combination of a convenient digital format and
a highly eﬃcient mean of distributing files at insignificant costs gave back
music its natural public good characteristic.
The first systematic sounds made by man could either please or displease
surrounding agents without aﬀecting the utility derived by others. Music is
therefore inherently a good with a strong element of non-excludability. This
characteristic can be limited. For instance, in case of a concert the physical
surroundings can make it possible to exclude non-paying agents. But the
most important event in terms of making music excludable was Thomas
Edison’s invention of sound recording and later the phonograph (1877-78),
which made it possible to ‘store’ and sell music to individual consumers
on a large scale. The result of this radical change was the birth of the
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music industry. The growth and profitability of that industry was (and is)
heavily supported by copyright laws, which in eﬀect made the music industry
monopolists with an unusually high degree of control over their products as
argued e.g. in Boldrine & Levine [3].
Today, many things have changed on the market for music, but we shall
argue that the key element related to an understanding of economic aspects
of the market development is the fact that music has regained its public good
characteristic through digitalization and the invention of P2P networks like
Napster, Gnutella, KaZaA, Freenet, YouTube, Pirate Bay etc.
Now, previous attempts by economists to understand and model the mar-
ket for digital products (including music) has primarily been related to mod-
els used in industrial organization, see e.g. the surveys in Peitz & Waelbroeck
[13], [14]. One strand of the literature has focused on piracy due to the ap-
parently direct relevance. Loosely speaking these models focus either on
quality diﬀerences (e.g. Novos & Waldman [11]) or network externalities
(e.g. Conner & Rumelt [4], Takeyama [17]). Another strand of the literature
has focused on the experience good aspect arguing that the Internet facili-
tates marketing of digital music increasing consumers’ willingness to pay and
decreasing promotion costs (e.g. Peitz & Waelbroeck [15] and Ducheˆne, Peitz
& Waelbroeck [8]).
In case of piracy models with positive network externalities, unauthorized
copying may end up being attractive both in terms of producers profits and
in terms of welfare. The argument is easy to follow in case of software where
cheap and easy access of copies drastically increases the number of customers
and thereby increases the value of the software for each customer. However,
in the particular case of music, network externalities seem to play a much
more modest role. Clearly there are elements of bandwagon eﬀects in music
consumption in the sense that everybody wants to play music that everybody
wants to hear (a sort of peer-group eﬀect) but the feedback on consumer value
is much less evident than in case of software where it is common to swap files
and there is a certain element of switching cost involved with being forced
5
to change software.
Piracy models with product diﬀerentiation (quality diﬀerences) are dif-
ficult to relate to the music market since there is low correlation between
production costs and product quality. Often bootleg or live versions out-
shine more expensive studio productions. However, there is another aspect
of the quality diﬀerences relating to the case of digital music. On the one
hand the quality of WAV-files (CD) oﬀer a better sound quality than MP3-
files and other formats often are converted WAV-files. On the other hand,
MP3-files oﬀer a better quality in terms of portability compared to WAV-
files (using, for instance, an iPod one’s entire music library can be carried
around). Therefore, the evaluation of the quality diﬀerences between the two
formats is far from evident.
In case of models focusing on experience goods the argument runs roughly
as follows (see [15]): a monopolist is selling a number of diﬀerent goods
and every customer buys at most one unit of one of the goods; without
samples the customers’ willingness to pay for any of the goods is the expected
reservation price; with samples the customers’ willingness to pay for any of
the goods is the diﬀerence between the true reservation price for the good
and the reservation price for the sample; depending on the parameters of
the model, the diﬀerence between the true reservation price for the good
and the reservation price for the sample might be higher than the expected
reservation price, and; consequently the monopolist might increase the profit
by providing free samples.
The argument in models focusing on experience goods rests on the as-
sumption that music is a private good. However, as explained above, when-
ever WAV-files are available, so are MP3-files in good quality via P2P-
networks. Therefore, the willingness to pay for WAV-files is the diﬀerence
between the reservation prices for WAV-files and MP3-files and not between
WAV-files and samples. As indicated by the widespread use of P2P networks
and the many conflicts between the music industry, artists and consumers,
the diﬀerence between reservation prices for WAV-files and MP3-files is prob-
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ably rather small. Hence the profit obtained by selling individual units of an
experience good characterized by non-excludability should be expected to be
very limited
As explained in the introduction we intend to consider a broader range
of business models than selling individual units as in the piracy models and
experience goods models: While enlarging the set of business models we
restrict attention to non-excludable goods.
3 Selling digital music using an aggregate price
We consider a scenario where a profit maximizing music publisher sets an
aggregate price for making the music available on the Web and a set of
customers submit voluntary bids: If the sum of the bids exceeds the aggregate
price then the music is provided and customers pay their bids. Otherwise
the music is not provided and nobody pays.
It is assumed that the music can be made available at zero cost (only
to increase transparency and without loss of generality). All customers (in
the following assumed to be 2) are endowed with individual initial wealth
w and an individual utility function u. The utility function is continuous
and increasing in wealth and availability of the music increases utility. For
each customer the willingness to pay is given by a number v that equals the
utility of getting the music having wealth w−v and the utility of not getting it
having wealth w. Assume that the willingness to pay is be interpreted as the
expected willingness to pay based on free samples, reviews, recommendations
from friends, earlier work by the artist etc. as usual when customers evaluate
experience goods. Since music has the characteristic of a public good (once
provided consumption cannot be excluded) the publisher cannot hope to sell
more than one copy on a usual market.
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3.1 A dynamic game with voluntary contributions
Rather than selling individual copies, the publisher can use an alternative
selling mechanism in order to maximize profits: Consider a “dynamic game”
where, at stage 1, the publisher announces a price π for making the music
available. At stage 2, customers submit their bids σ specifying how much they
are willing to contribute. If the sum of the bids exceeds the announced price
the music is made available and customers pay their bids to the publisher,
otherwise everything remains at status quo. For a start assume that there is
complete information.
Using the principle of backward induction we first analyze customer be-
havior. On the one hand, suppose that the total willingness to pay is smaller
than the announced price, then “no production” is the only outcome that
cannot be blocked by any group of customers. Therefore, we remain at status
quo. On the other hand suppose that the total willingness to pay exceeds
the announced price, then “production” is the only outcome that cannot be
blocked by any group of customers. However, there are many supporting
strategy profiles, i.e., all profiles where each individual contribution is less
than or equal to the willingness to pay and they add up to the announced
total price: No customer will benefit from contributing more since produc-
tion is already ensured and no one will benefit from contributing less since
this would imply that the music is not made available.
Given this behavior among the customers, it is clear that the profit max-
imizing strategy of the publisher is to announce a price equal to the total
willingness to pay, which is known under complete information.1
Equilibria in the above game, i.e., the described strategies of both the
customers and the publisher, are eﬃcient in the sense that the music is pro-
duced and made available if and only if the total willingness to pay is positive.
Moreover, the publisher captures all gains of exchange. Consequently, a mo-
nopolist with complete information selling an information good is able to
1Technically speaking, this equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect strong Nash
equilibrium of the game.
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first-order price discriminate despite the fact that non-excludability is an
important characteristic of information goods. In other words, within the
framework of the model, selling music does not constitute a problem with
respect to profitability and eﬃciency - it only calls for a diﬀerent selling mech-
anism. Note, further that even if the publisher could impose excludability
it would not be profitable since a fixed price for all customers would reduce
the profit. However, the assumption of complete information is obviously
unrealistic as we shall now discuss.
At first glance it appears to be somewhat surprising that the publisher
is able to first-order price discriminate in the presence of non-excludability
since public goods give incentives to free ride. Hence, the problem of free
riding is caused by the fact that no customer is pivotal. That is, no customer
finds that their contribution determines whether the music is provided or
not so it is an optimizing strategy to avoid contributing. Full information
enables the publisher to set a price that makes every customer pivotal and
thus solves the problem of free riding. Now, with incomplete information
free riding reappears as will be demonstrated in Section 3.2. In particular it
can be noted that the market ought to be designed in such a way that the
probability for each customer of being pivotal is made as large as possible.
The simple voluntary contribution mechanism used in stage 2 of the above
game replicates the mechanism in Bagnoli & Lipman [1], where it is analyzed
with respect to stability and welfare.
3.2 Informational assumptions
In practice the publisher as well as customers will never have complete infor-
mation in the above sense. Since music is an experience good, the publishers
themselves are in principle able to influence the customers’ willingness to pay
through their release of product information. For example, if willingness to
pay is likely to be high, the publisher has an interest in feeding information
to customers. Reversely, if willingness to pay is likely to be low, the publisher
has an interest in withholding information.
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However this information strategy itself reveals the expectations of the
publisher. Combined with the fact that a lot of independent information
inevitable will be available in form of samples on YouTube, reviews etc. this
suggests that there is very limited scope for strategic use of information.
Therefore, we assume that customers know their own expected willingness
to pay. But, even if customers know their own willingness to pay, the in-
formational problem is twofold since: 1. for a given price π the customers
may not know the total willingness to pay and thereby be uncertain about
the other customers’ contributions, and; 2. the publisher may not know the
total willingness to pay (even in case it is common knowledge among the
customers) and hence may have problems in determining the price π such
that the profit is maximized.
If the latter problem occurs, various forms of marketing research such as
consumer surveys, observational research etc. may prove useful in obtaining
an estimate of the total willingness to pay. To the extent that the estimates
are precise the mechanism described above is still reliable although it is
ineﬃcient in the sense that there is a chance for a total willingness to pay
that is below the announced price (and above the costs of production). In
short, there may be a trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and profitability that is
absent in the complete information scenario.
In order to illustrate the consequences of incomplete information among
risk neutral customers we consider the following example: Assume that there
are two customers with two possible levels of willingness to pay, v and v∗
where 0 < v < v∗. Assume that the probabilities for each of the four possible
states is given by the following matrix where α+ 2β + γ = 1.
v v∗
v α β
v∗ β γ
This prior distribution is common knowledge among all agents and individual
customers know their own willingness to pay.
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3.3 One-sided complete information
First, we consider a scenario where both customers know their own as well
as the other customer’s willingness to pay. The publisher on the other hand
only knows the prior distribution - this is supposed to capture situations
where the publisher is less in touch with market trends than the customers
themselves. Now, the publisher’s problem is to set a price that maximizes
expected profit. In short, he has three options; 2v, v + v∗ or 2v∗. If the
publisher sets a price equal to 2v, this also becomes the expected profit since
both customers will contribute v with probability 1. If the price is set at
2v∗, the expected profit is equal to 2γv∗ since there is only a probability of
γ for the case where both customers have a willingness to pay that equals
v∗. Finally, if the price is set at v+ v∗, the expected profit is (1−α)(v+ v∗)
since the only case where the good is not provided is where both customers
have a willingness to pay that equals v. Hence, the optimizing strategy for
the publisher is to set the price
π =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2v for v ≥ max{γ, 1− α
1 + α}v
∗
v + v∗ for (
2γ
1− α − 1)v
∗ ≤ v ≤ 1− α
1 + αv
∗
2v∗ for v ≤ min{γ, 2γ
1− α − 1}v
∗.
Note that, depending on the parameters there may be two or three price
regions. In case of two regions the price is either 2v or 2v∗ and in case of
three regions the price may also be v + v∗ (as implicitly assumed in Figure
1).
If the diﬀerence v∗− v is suﬃciently small then the publisher chooses the
smallest price, 2v, ensuring eﬃciency with a limited loss of profit compared
to the complete information scenario. On the contrary, if the diﬀerence is
suﬃciently large the price should be 2v∗ which results in ineﬃciency because
with probability 1 − γ the good is not sold even though the price ensures
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maximal expected profit (see also Figure 1). To sum up; the expected profit
in the one-sided complete information scenario is strictly smaller than the
expected profit in the complete information scenario.
3.4 Incomplete information
Secondly, consider a scenario where both customers only know their own
willingness to pay and all three agents know the prior distribution - this
captures situations where both the publisher and the customers are equally
uninformed. As before there are two obvious candidates for a price; 2v and
2v∗ with expected profit 2v and 2γv∗, respectively. However, contrary to the
first scenario the third price is now set between 2v and v + v∗ because if the
price is v + v∗ then the expected utility of truth-telling for v∗−types is zero
while it may be strictly positive in case of lying (as there is a probability
of γ/(β + γ) that the other customer is a v∗-type yielding expected utility
(γ/(β+γ))(v∗−v) ≥ 0 of lying) - thus giving customers of v∗-type incentives
to free ride. Given a price v ≤ π¯ ≤ v+v∗ there is an equilibrium in the stage
2 game (σ,σ∗) = (v, π¯− v) with v∗− σ∗ ≥ (γ/(β + γ))(v∗− v) which implies
that the publisher shall set the price
π¯ = 2γ
1− α+ γ 2v +
1− α− γ
1− α+ γ (v + v
∗).
Given the price π¯ the publisher’s expected profit is (1− α)π¯.
Thus, the optimizing strategy for the publisher is now to set the price
π =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2v for v ≥ max{γ, (1− α− γ)(1− α)
(1− α− γ)(1 + α) + 4αγ }v
∗
π¯ for ( (3(1− α) + γ)2γ
((1− α) + 3γ)(1− α) − 1)v
∗ ≤ v ≤ (1− α− γ)(1− α)
(1− α− γ)(1 + α) + 4αγ v
∗
2v∗ for v ≤ min{γ, (3(1− α) + γ)2γ
((1− α) + 3γ)(1− α) − 1}v
∗.
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Since, it is easy to show that
(1− α− γ)(1− α)
(1− α− γ)(1 + α) + 4αγ ≤
1− α
1 + α ,
(3(1− α) + γ)2γ
((1− α) + 3γ)(1− α) − 1 ≥
2γ
1− α − 1,
we observe that incomplete information among the customers results in a
weakly decreasing lower bound for the low price, 2v, and a weakly increasing
upper bound for the high price, 2v∗, compared to the one-sided complete
information scenario where the customers had complete information about
the other customers willingness to pay. Hence, the following two observations
can be made:
Observation 1. If the publisher chooses the price 2v or the price 2v∗ in
the one-sided complete information scenario this remains the optimal price
in the incomplete information scenario as well.
Observation 2. If the publisher chooses the price π¯ in the incomplete
information scenario then he chooses the price v+v∗ in the one-sided complete
information scenario.
Figure 1 compares the price schemes of the one-sided complete and in-
complete information scenarios in case all three price regions are possible for
both scenarios.
To sum up; the expected profit in the incomplete information scenario is
weakly smaller than the expected profit in the one-sided complete information
scenario.
Finally, it is hardly surprising that the problem of free riding introduced
by incomplete information seems to become worse with an increasing number
of customers as each customer has a smaller chance of being pivotal. Hence
loosely speaking; the more the scenario deviates from one-sided complete in-
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Price
v
w
2γ
1− α − 1
W
v∗
1− α
1 + αv
∗ v
∗
2v∗
One-sided complete information
Incomplete information
Figure 1: Price as function of v for
1− α
1 + α ≥ γ.
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formation the more it becomes important for succesful use of the mechanism
that the number of customers is limited.
3.5 Information and profit
In conclusion, weakening the informational requirements the mechanism still
works but expected profits may now be reduced (even considerably) as the
publisher is no longer guaranteed to sell his product. In fact, the following
theorem is a direct consequence of the above analysis:
Observation 3. Let ΠC(v, v∗), ΠP (v, v∗) and ΠI(v, v∗) be the expected
profit in the complete, one-sided complete and incomplete information sce-
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nario, respectively. Then
ΠC(v, v∗) > ΠP (v, v∗) ≥ ΠI(v, v∗).
In other words, decreasing information leads to decreasing expected prof-
its. It is clear that the publisher is always better oﬀ knowing the willingness
to pay among the customers. However, such information is relative costly to
obtain as it involves data mining procedures, consumer surveys etc. What
seems more interesting though is that any action taken by the publisher that
may increase the information among the customers will tend to increase his
profitability. This conclusion is in line with the findings in Cre´mer & McLean
[5] concerning allocation mechanisms under asymmetric information.
Perhaps more importantly this conclusion is in line with the actual be-
havior of record companies as they induce the formation of fan-societies via
the Web as well as software companies supporting the formation of customer-
groups etc. — all in order to increase communication (and thereby informa-
tion) between customers with respect to their “types”. The Web itself seems
to facilitate such actions since it involves very limited costs for individuals
to meet and exchange information in cyber space.
Finally, more sophisticated mechanisms can be developed using a Bayesian
approach as done for private goods in Cre´mer & McLean [6] and extended
to public goods below.
4 Selling digital music using a Bayesian mech-
anism
We now consider a mechanism where the publisher chooses a pricing scheme
and customers, knowing this scheme, choose their bids. Formally, the pub-
lisher and the customers know the distribution of willingness to pay, but
customers further know their own willingness to pay (i.e., as in the case of
incomplete information).
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The selling mechanism used by the publisher has three stages: Firstly,
the publisher announces how payments and the release of the music depend
on the customers’ bids. Secondly, the customers submit their bids. Thirdly,
customers’ payments and whether the music is released or not are determined
by the publisher according to the announced mechanism. The selling mech-
anism shall mimic a market in the sense that customers should be able to
ensure that they pay nothing (voluntary participation). Therefore, the set
of possible bids of the customers consists of their valuation of the music and
non-participation.
4.1 A Cremer-McLean mechanism for public goods
Recall the example of the previous sections. When customers have two pos-
sible valuations v and v∗, their set of possible bids is S = {v, v∗, n} where n
corresponds to non-participation. The payment is a map p : S×S → R where
p(s1, s2) is the payment of a customer submitting the bid s1 (and p(s2, s1) is
the payment of the customer submitting the bid s2). Moreover, p(n, s2) = 0
as the customer submitting the bid n pays nothing. Whether the music is
released or not is described by a map r : S × S → {0, 1}, where r(s1, s2) = 0
corresponds to the music not being released and r(s1, s2) = 1 corresponds to
the music being released.
The problem of the publisher is to maximize the expected profit given
that customers tell the truth about their willingness to pay, i.e the problem
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of the publisher becomes,
max
p,r
2(αp(v, v) + β(p(v, v∗) + p(v∗, v)) + γp(v∗, v∗))
s.t.
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
αr(v, v)(v − p(v, v)) + βr(v, v∗)(v − p(v, v∗))
≥ αr(v∗, v)(v − p(v∗, v)) + βr(v∗, v∗)(v − p(v∗, v∗))
αr(v, v)(v − p(v, v)) + βr(v, v∗)(v − p(v, v∗))
≥ αr(n, v)(v − p(n, v)) + βr(n, v∗)(v − p(n, v∗))
βr(v∗, v)(v∗ − p(v∗, v)) + γr(v∗, v∗)(v∗ − p(v∗, v∗))
≥ βr(v, v)(v∗ − p(v, v)) + γr(v, v∗)(v∗ − p(v, v∗))
βr(v∗, v)(v∗ − p(v∗, v)) + γr(v∗, v∗)(v∗ − p(v∗, v∗))
≥ βr(n, v)(v∗ − p(n, v)) + γr(n, v∗)(v∗ − p(n, v∗))
p(n, v) = p(n, v∗) = p(n, n) = 0
Suppose that each customer learns about the distribution of the willing-
ness to pay of the other customer by learning his own willingness to pay.
According to Bayes rule, if one customer knows that his own willingness to
pay is v then the conditional probability of the willingness to pay of the other
customer being v as well, is α/(α+β). Likewise, if one customer knows that
his own willingness to pay is v∗ then the conditional probability of the will-
ingness to pay of the other customer being v, is β/(β+γ). Therefore, learning
the type of one customer contains information about the type of the other
customer if and only if α/(α+ β) W= β/(β + γ) or equivalently αγ − β2 W= 0,
which is assumed to be satisfied in the following.
A solution to the problem of the publisher is a selling mechanism where
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the payments are
p(v, v) =
γ(α+ β)v − β(β + γ)v∗
αγ − β2
p(v, v∗) = −β(α+ β)v − α(β + γ)v
∗
αγ − β2
p(v∗, v) =
γ(α+ β)v − β(β + γ)v∗
αγ − β2
p(v∗, v∗) =
β(α+ β)v − α(β + γ)v∗
αγ − β2
and p(n, v) = p(n, v∗) = p(n, n) = 0 and the release is r(v, v) = r(v, v∗) =
r(v∗, v) = r(v∗, v∗) = 1 and r(n, v) = r(v, n) = r(n, v∗) = r(v∗, n) =
r(n, n) = 0.
Telling the truth is a Nash equilibrium for the customers and the expected
profit for the publisher at the Nash equilibrium is 2(αv+β(v+v∗)+γv∗), so
the publisher captures all gains of trade. Consequently there exists a business
model such that a monopolist with incomplete information who is selling an
information good is able to first-order discriminate.
As discussed in Mailath & Postlewaite [10], and obvious from the payment
scheme calculated above, the payments may become arbitrarily large (both
positive and negative). This aspect alone may limit the practical scope of
such a mechanism. However, even considered as a theoretical result it seems
of somewhat limited relevance because minor deviations from the set up
changes the conclusion dramatically as will be seen below.
4.2 Uncertainty about the number of customers
Suppose that there areN potential customers, who are randomly transformed
into actual customers, who are able to bid, and absent customers. In our
model a customer, who is absent bids n, while actual customers are able to
submit any possible bid including n. A straight forward interpretation is
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that all potential customers are actual customers but their bids may get lost
due to server breakdowns, technical problems, accidents etc. An alternative
interpretation is that customers may have negative expected willingness to
pay since participation may be costly in terms of time and the expected value
of the product may be close to zero (this is all the more likely in case of music
because in general willingness to pay must be lower for experience goods as
it requires an eﬀort to make the actual evaluation). Consequently, it may
not be worth it for the publisher to provide incentives for these customers,
so the publisher wants them to be absent.
Intuitively, it is no longer possible to obtain full extraction: On the one
hand, if the publishers only release the good in case all customers submit bids
diﬀerent from n (implying that all potential customers are transformed into
actual customers), then there is a possibility that the music is not released
and nothing is paid. On the other hand, if the publisher accepts to release
the good even though he receives some bids equal to n, then actual customers
might speculate in bidding n and thereby free ride. Moreover, we show that
the ratio between profit and the total willingness to pay converge to zero as
the number of potential users tends to infinity leaving little room for profits.
A selling mechanism is a (N+1)-tuple ((pj)
N
j=1, r) where pj : {v, n}N → R
is the payment of potential customer j and r : {v, n}N → {0, 1} is the release
decision.
Assume for simplicity that all actual customers have valuation v, i.e.,
there is no uncertainty about the valuation. Moreover assume that a potential
customer is transformed into an actual customer with probability 1−ε where
0 < ε < 1.
Theorem 1. Let σ(N) be the maximal payment per customer. Then
lim
N→∞
σ(N) ≤ v
5
1− ε
ε
1
2πN .
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
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Theorem 1 states that if the number of potential customers tends to
infinity, then the maximal average payment per customer converges to zero
as fast as one over the squareroot of the number of customers converges to
zero. Note, however, that this is not at odds with the maximal total payment
being increasing in the number of potential customers. Indeed if the number
of potential customers tends to infinity, then the maximal total payment
tends to infinity as fast as the squareroot of the number of customers tends
to infinity.
Consider the following example: Assume that customers have a willing-
ness to pay 1 dollar (v = 1) for a given music file. Let the probability of
being non-present be equal to one per mille (ε = 0.001). Then the upper
bound of the maximal payment per customer is 13 cents for 10, 000 potential
customers, 1.3 cents for 1, 000, 000 potential customers and 0.13 cents for
100, 000, 000 potential customers. For comparison we may note that Michael
Jackson’s ‘Thriller’ has sold around 100, 000, 000 copies.
4.3 Mechanism design and profitability
The mechanism approach may seem somewhat theoretical when it comes to
formulating a business model for the music industry. However, the inten-
tion was to demonstrate that no business model selling directly to customers
(including models where the publisher does not sell individual copies) is prof-
itable.
In particular, we have shown that introducing uncertainty about the num-
ber of actual customers (which may seem a small practical detail) significantly
invalidates the Cremer-McLean result of full extraction because free riding
reintroduces itself as a serious problem. Indeed, the calculations above show
that, on average, if one potential customer per thousand is absent when bid-
ding, then the obtained revenue is equivalent to only thirteen per thousand
customers are paying their true willingness to pay in case of one million
potential customers.
20
5 Concluding discussion
Many attempts to find ‘solutions’ to free riding problems, like selling music
in the presence of P2P networks, have been made. Below we provide a
taxonomy of such attempts:
• Mechanism design. In this case the producer designs a selling mech-
anism trying to reduce free riding. For example, the author Stephen
King launched a novel called ‘The Plant’ exclusively on the Web using
the following procedure: Two installments were oﬀered to anyone who
registered. These installments could be downloaded for free but the
customers were invited to pay 1 dollar each to King for the privilege.
It was stated that if 75 percent of those who downloaded also paid he
would continue to oﬀer new installments until the novel was complete.
• The Disney model. In this case the producer is fighting fiercely for their
legal rights against piracy as Disney has done for decades.
• The game consol model. In this case the producers focus on techno-
logical protection of their rights making it diﬃcult for the consumer to
copy their products.
• Bundling with private good. In this case the non-excludable information
good is bundled with a (more or less) excludable good in order to reduce
free riding.
• The eyeball model. In this case the producer is turning the primary
product, the non-excludable information good, into a secondary prod-
uct generating profit from selling access to its customers rather than
only selling the good itself.
• Open source. In this case the producer makes the product freely avail-
able often with the result that the product becomes a documentation
of their skills and quality, which in turn may prove to be profitable in
other ways.
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As our analysis suggests, mechanism design is not a solution for the music
industry.
When P2P networks were introduced the immediate answer from the mu-
sic industry was to fight hard for their legal rights claiming that downloading
music was harmful for society, because in the long run it would prevent the
making of music itself, and should be considered as theft. Obviously, both
these claims are wrong considering the non-excludable character of music.
But more interestingly, it seems that the strategy of fighting hard for legal
rights will prove wrong, too, in the long run (if not already).
Indeed, an immediate look at P2P networks reveals that downloading is a
widespread phenomenon and just about anything continue to be available for
free. Moreover, online sales at very low prices is available, apparently under
legal conditions as e.g. on the Russian site MP3Sparks.com where albums
typically cost around 2 dollars. This indicates that showcase lawsuits as used
by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) have a rather
limited eﬀect - if not being directly harmful for the image of an industry
declaring war against their own customers. Therefore, it appears that using
the ‘Disney model’ to maintain music as an excludable good is futile given
the current technological conditions.
Another attempt to maintain excludability of music has been to use copy
protection directly on CD’s and legally bought MP3 files as in the ‘game
console model’. Copy protection of CD’s proved to be a real nuisance for the
customers since all sorts of problems occurred during the legal use of the CD’s
and thereby lowered the value of the CD itself. Furthermore, the protection
was inadequate as it did not prevent copying in eﬀect. Moreover, DRM
on MP3 files prevents the buyer from making more than a certain limited
amount of copies of the legally bought file - again limiting the value of the file
itself. There seems to be a movement towards abandoning this strategy (for
example, iTunes store is now selling all music from EMI’s catalogue DRM-
free and will work towards being entirely DRM-free within a year) and there
are many sites not using DRM (like emusic, MP3Sparks etc.) and software,
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which de-DRM files, is freely available on the Web. The ‘game console model’
is consequently not working either.
Yet another attempt of the recording industry is to bundle music with
some private good. For example, Bon Jovi issued a CD where the buyer got
rights to buy concert tickets before other consumers. The Cardigans issued a
CD giving the buyer a possibility of entering a web site with extra material,
etc. However, given the non-excludable character of music, customers still
have limited willingness to pay for music and, therefore, what is paid for
is, in fact, only the private good. Yet it cannot be ruled out that CDs can
be branded such that they become attractive by themselves as has been the
case with bottled water etc., but facts remain that CD sales have dropped
dramatically.
Consequently, this leaves the future business model of the music industry
to be some kind of combination of the ‘eyeball model’ and the ‘open source
model’ according to our taxonomy.
As such we argue that the future market form for music will consist
of online stores like those existing now but with considerably lower prices
and lower profitability. As in open source it may prove worthwhile to give
up ones legal rights in order to encourage fan participation and build up
reputation (especially because music is an experience good). This reputation
can subsequently be used to generate various sorts of profit coming from
direct voluntary payments from fans, sales of merchandize and concerts or as
in the eyeball model selling access to fans and listeners to other companies.
The latest trend appears to be that even major artists like Madonna switch
away from record companies to contracts directly with concert promoters
because as Madonna commented ‘the paradigm in the music business has
shifted and as an artist and a business woman, I have to move with that
shift’.
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6 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
The set of states is Σ = {v, n}N . For σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ) if σj = v then
potential customer j is transformed into an actual customer and if σj = n
then potential customer j is transformed into a customer who is absent. The
set of strategy profiles is S = {v, n}N . For s = (s1, . . . , sN ) if sj = v then
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customer j is using the strategy v implying that customer j is an actual
customer and if sj = n then customer j is using the strategy n implying
that customer j is either a customer who is absent or an actual customer
pretending to be a customer who is absent.
Let μ(s) be the probability that the strategy profile is s given that every
potential customer tells the truth. For a strategy profile s where N − K
potential customers are transformed into actual customers and K potential
customers are transformed into customers who are absent the probability
μ(s) is εK(1 − ε)N−K . Let μ(s|tj = n) be the probability that the strategy
profile is s given that customer j uses the strategy n. For a strategy profile
where the number of n’s is K and the number of v’s is N−K the probability
μ(s|tj = n) is εK−1(1− ε)N−K for sj = n and 0 for sj = v.
The problem of the publisher is
max
((pj)Nj=1,r)
3
s
μ(s)
3
j
pj(s)
s.t.
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
3
s
μ(s)(r(s)v − pj(s))
≥
3
s
μ(s|tj = n)(r(s)v − pj(s)) for all j
pj(s) = 0 for all s with sj = n and all j
Let:
b(K;N, ε) =
X
N
K
~
εK(1− ε)N−K
B(M ;N, ε) =
3
K≤M
b(K;N, ε).
Suppose that I(a) ∈ Z is the integer part of a ∈ R, i.e., a ≤ I(a) < a+ 1,
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and let (p, r) be a mechanism that maximizes surplus then:
Nσ(N) =

s μ(s)

j pj(s)
≤

s r(s)

i(μ(s)− μ(s|tj = n))
= N(B(I(εN);N, ε)− B(I(εN)− 1;N − 1, ε))
= (1− ε)Nb(I(εN);N − 1, ε)
= (N − I(εN))b(I(εN);N, ε)
where the first equality follows from the definition of σ(N), the second equal-
ity follows from straight forward calculations and the last two equalities follow
from Feller (1968) and straight forward calculations. Finally;
lim
N→∞
√
Nb(I(εN);N − 1, ε) = 10
2πε(1− ε)
according to Stirling’s formula.
Q.E.D.
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